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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant contends that the intoxilyzer test result 
was improperly received into evidence since only one § 41-6-44.3 
affidavit was introduced. Appellant submits that logic and 
§ 41-6-44.3 require that two affidavits, one prior to and one 
after the intoxilyzer test was administered, must be introduced 
before a test result can be received. Appellant also submits 
that the affidavit was improperly received because it was not 
accompanied by a custodian's certificate. In the absence of such 
a document, the affidavit does not satisfy the requirements set 
forth by § 41-6-44.3 or Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Ut. 
1983). Appellant also argues that the test result was improperly 
received since no findings were made that the challenged affida-
vit was generated under circumstances indicating trustworthiness. 
Similarly, no findings were made that the machine complied with 
standards prom-ulgated by the commissioner of public safety. 
Appellant also submits that viewing all the evidence, her arrest 
was not supported by probable cause. Appellant also submits that 
the hearing she received failed to afford her due process of law. 
Not enough safeguards against error were incorporated into the 
hearing. Additionally, the hearing officer was not impartial. 
Because the hearing officer acted as both prosecutor and judge, 
no independent judicial determination was made. Finally, 
appellant submits that she was denied equal protection of the 
law. Although she agreed to submit to a chemical test, she 
received far less due process than the uncooperative driver who 
refuses to submit to such a test. 
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment suspending appellant's 
driving privileges for ninety days in th[e Third District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dean E. 
Conder, presiding. 
In a review authorized by U.C.A|. § 41-2-20, the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder of the Third Judicial District Court 
found that the suspension of appellant's| driving privileges was 
not arbitrary or capricious. 
STATEMENT OF FACJTS 
On July 29, 1984, Utah Highway patrol Trooper K. Craig 
Allred observed the appellant driving wejstbound on Interstate 80 
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Appellant's vehicle was observed making an abrupt lane change as 
it entered the freeway. The Trooper estimated the appellant acce-
lerated to 80 miles per hour. The Trooper initiated a traffic 
stop of the appellant (Transcript of Hearing, 4). The Trooper 
detected an odor of alcohol and requested the appellant to submit 
to field agility tests (T.5). 
The first test was the alphabet test. On her first 
attempt, appellant became nervous, and asked if she could perform 
the test a second time (T.21). On her second attempt, the 
Trooper testified she recited correctly until the letter "U". At 
that point the Trooper stated the appellant said, "U, N, V, W, 
X, Y, Z," (T.5). The appellant explained that her use of "N" in 
between the letters "U" and "V" was a Utah colloquialism for the 
article of speech, "and" (T.21). Appellant denied that she had 
confused the letters. 
The second test was the finger count. Appellant per-
formed this test correctly two out of three times (T.16). The 
next test was a balance test where the subject tilts her head 
back and closes her eyes. The Trooper observed her move a little 
bit (T.18). The Trooper conceded that everyone who performs that 
test moves a little (T.18). The next test was the finger to nose 
test. The appellant touched the tip of her nose with the first 
digit of her index finger on her first attempt. This deviated 
from the direction to touch tip to tip (T.18). On her second 
attempt, appellant touched tip to tip with her thumb. 
On the heel-to-toe test, the appellant took the correct 
number of steps in each direction, turned correctly, but left 
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several inches between her heel and her toe on a few steps 
(T.19). The last test was the key drop. The object of this test 
is for the subject to move her foot aft^r the officer drops the 
keys, but before the keys hit the subject's foot. One out of 
three times the appellant moved her foot so the keys did not 
stike it (T. 6). 
Appellant did not slur her speech throughout her contact 
with Trooper Allred (T.13). She was cooperative, but nervous 
and over-anxious (T.13). During the performance of the tests, 
appellant told the Trooper that she had sore feet from hiking all 
day (T.14). 
At the conclusion of the tests, the appellant was 
arrested for driving under the influence. An intoxilyzer test 
was administered with a .10 result (T.9)|. 
Appellant received a "per se" hearing before respondent. 
The hearing was conducted by Dennis Hicks, an employee of respon-
dent (T. 1). One affidavit dated July 25, 1984 was introduced at 
the hearing to establish the trustworthiness of the machine used 
to test the appellant's blood alcohol content. (Appendix 1). 
Appellant's driver's license was suspended for ninety days after 
the hearing pursuant to U.C.A. §41-2-19.fe. 
On appeal to the district court, the matter was sub-
mitted to the court after legal arguments and memoranda were 
submitted. No additional evidence was offered by either party to 
supplement the record. Respondent's suspension of appellant's 
driver's license was affirmed by the district court. The 
appellant's request to have her license teinstated pending the 
outcome of her appeal in this Court was denied. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS TO 
RECEIVE INTO EVIDENCE THE INTOXILYZER 
TEST RESULT WHEN ONLY ONE § 41-6-44.3 
AFFIDAVIT WAS INTRODUCED 
At the appellant's administrative per se hearing, only 
one affidavit (Appendix 1) was introduced which purported to 
attest to the accuracy and trustworthiness of the intoxilyzer 
test result in the case at bar. That affidavit is dated July 25, 
1984. No other affidavit was introduced attesting to the 
accuracy and proper functioning of the machine at any time after 
the appellant's arrest date. 
It is the appellant's position that in the absence of 
some evidence of the accuracy and proper functioning of the 
intoxilyzer machine after appellant's arrest, no proper foun-
dation was laid for the receipt into evidence of the intoxilyzer 
test result. It is elementary that the proponent of the intoxi-
lyzer must show that the machine was functioning properly before 
test results can be received. Although an intoxilyzer may be 
operating properly on a given datef it does not necessarily 
follow that the machine is still operating accurately four days 
later. Both the case law and standards promulgated by the 
Commissioner of Public Safety pursuant to U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3 
recognize this logic. 
U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3 (Appendix 2) set forth the foun-
dational requirements for affidavits to be introduced in lieu of 
an officer's testimony regarding the maintenance and proper 
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functioning of a breath testing instrument. The statute incor-
porates into its foundational requirements the Commissioner's 
Breath Testing Regulations (Appendix 3). Regulation III(A), 
Tests for Checking Calibration, providesz "Breath testing instru-
ments must be certified on a routine basis not to exceed forty 
(40) days." 
The logic behind this requirement must certainly be that 
if a machine was functioning before and after a particular test 
was administered, then an inference can be drawn that the machine 
functioned properly on the date of the subject test if the opera-
tor followed the steps properly. In the absence of such testi-
mony which "bookends" the subject test, a finder of fact is left 
to speculate and conjecture whether the machine functioned pro-
perly on the subject date. Regardless of whether the breath test 
is utilized in a criminal or civil setting, this minimum foun-
dational requirement inheres. 
POINT II 
THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVIT WAS IMPROPERLY 
RECEIVED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED 
BY A CUSTODIAN'S CERTIFICATE 
The challenged July 25th affidavit (Appendix 1) was 
introduced into evidence at the administrative per se hearing by 
the Hearing Officer. No explanation is offered on the face of 
the docuemnt which explains where it came from, who maintained 
it, whether it was maintained in the regular course of anyone's 
official duties, or even how it appeared in the Hearing Officer's 
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possession. It was not included in the peicket of documents 
mailed to the Department of Public Safety by the arresting 
officer. It was not accompanied by a "Custodian's Certificate." 
Although Troopers Nielsen and Kooring have signed the document 
underneath the words "Breath Test Technician(s)", there is 
nothing on the face of the affidavit to attest to the authenticity 
of any such training or expertise. Furthermore, although the 
affidavits states that the test of the machine was done according 
to standards established by the Commissioner of the Department of 
Public Safety, there is nothing on the face of the document to 
verify the assertions of Troopers Kooring and Nielsen. 
Appellant submits that a Custodian's Certificate 
(Appendix 4) is a necesary predicate for the admissibility of the 
July 25th affidavit. Custodian's Certificate could serve to 
explain the source of the July 25th affidavit. It could also 
explain where the original document was located. But perhaps 
most importantly, it could certify the qualifications of the 
breath test technicians. Nothing on the July 25th affidavit 
asserts that either Trooper Kooring or Trooper Nielsen have met 
any of the requirements for breath test technicians as set forth 
in Regulation V of the Breath Testing Regulations. (Appendix 3). 
In the absence of such information, the affidavit alone does not 
establish that a qualified technician, as mandated by U.C.A. § 
41-6-44.3(1), has examined the machine. 
Because the affidavit simply appeared at the hearing 
below without an accompanying Custodian Certificate, its genesis 
is a mystery. Appellant submits that the "indications of trust-
- 6 -
worthiness" requirement of~§ 41-6-44.3(2)(b) precludes the 
admission of the July 25th affidavit without some additional 
foundation. Again, the Custodian's Certificate would appear to 
remedy the defect since such a document could help to support a 
finding that the method and circumstances of the affidavit's pre-
paration were such as to indicate its trustworthiness. 
§ 41-6-44.3 requires such findings before an affidavit may be 
received. If there was some basis to conclude that the tech-
nician was an expert, as required by statute, then a finding 
could be made consistent with the mandate of § 41-6-44.3(2)(a) 
and (b) that the testing procedure was trustworthy. Absent such 
information, the July 25th affidavit alone does not satisfy the 
minimum foundational requirements imposed by § 41-6-44.3. 
In Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Ut. 1983), this 
court stated that § 41-6-44.3 was a codification of the business 
records exception. In State v. Bertul, 644 P.2d 1181 (Ut. 1983), 
the Supreme Court discussed the foundational requirements for the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule. In Bertful, one 
of the requirements set forth for a business record to be 
admitted was that "the evidence must support a conclusion that 
after recordation the document was kept under circumstances that 
would preserve its integrity." In the instant matter, only spe-
culation can lead to such a conclusion. For these reasons, 
appellant submits that the receipt into evidence of the intoxi-
lyzer test result was arbitrary and capricious. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE THE HEARING OFFICER FAILED TO 
MAKE FINDINGS IN COMPLIANCE WITH SUB-
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SECTIONS (1) AND (2) OF § 41-6-44.3, 
THE RECEIPT OF THE INTOXILYZER TEST 
RESULT WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
The administrative hearing officer failed to make any 
findings as mandated by subsections (1) and (2) of § 41-6-44.3. 
The trial judge also failed to make any such findings. The trial 
judge did, however, refer to "reliability" in Conclusion of Law 
#3: 
The Court concludes that the intox-
ilyzer machine was reliable and the 
results admissible before the De-
partment pursuant to the presumption 
set forth in U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3 and 
44.3, a'nd Murray City v. Hall. 
This reference does not satisfy the strict requirement 
that such findings be made before § 41-6-44.3 affidavits can be 
received into evidence. In Murray City v. Hall, supra, this 
court noted that such findings would not be implied. 
Accordingly, since no such findings were made, the July 25th affi-
davit was inadmissible, and its receipt into evidence was 
arbitrary and capricious. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S ARREST WAS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY REASONABLE GROUNDS 
AND WAS THEREFORE UNLAWFUL 
The appellant's driving pattern consisted of speeding 
and one abrupt lane change. This driving pattern does not in 
itself amount to probable cause to arrest the appelalnt for 
driving under the influence. In addition to the driving pattern, 
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the arresting officer also testified that he detected the 
odor of alcohol on appellant's breath. These facts were also 
insufficient to rise to the level of probable cause. 
The only other evidence to support a finding of probable 
cause was the appellant's performance on the field agility tests. 
Judging a driver's performance on field agility tests is a sub-
jective task at best. In the case at bar, the appellant submits 
that her performance on the field tests did not give rise to a 
finding of probable cause that she was appreciably impaired as a 
rsult of the consumption of an alcoholic beverage. Although the 
appellant made some minor errors on the tests, her over-all per-
formance was satisfactory. Indeed, appellant submits that this 
was a case where the arresting officer continued to administer 
tests until the appellant finally failed a test. Viewing all the 
evidence, appellant submits that her arijest was not supported by 
reasonable grounds to believe she was under the influence. 
Because the arrest was unlawful, the suspension of her license 
was arbitrary and capricious. 
POINT V 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS 41-2-19.6 
AND 41-2-20 DENY UTAH DRIVERS OF PRO-
CEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmen-
tal decisions which deprive citizens of "liberty" or "property" 
interests within the meaning of the Due process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
- 9 -
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 569-571 (1972), Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302 
(Utah 1979). In our mobile society, the retention of a driver's 
license is an important right to every person who has obtained 
such a license. 
Although the United States Supreme Court once recognized 
a distinction between "rights" and "privileges" in determining 
whether to afford due process protection to asserted property 
rights, the Court has now abandoned the artificial distinction 
between rights and privileges. Instead, the Court has expressed 
a preference for a flexible definition of property: 
"Property" interests subject to procedural 
due process protection are not limited by 
a few rigid, technical forms,. Rather, 
"property" denotes a broad range of in-
terests that are secured by "existing rules 
or understandings. " 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
And in Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 577, 
the Court observed: 
It is a purpose of the ancient institution 
of property to protect those claims upon 
which people rely in their daily lives, 
reliance that must not be arbitrarily 
undermined. It is a purpose of the con-
stitutional right to a hearing to provide 
an opportunity for a person to vindicate 
those claims. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also adopted this reasoning 
in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 
P.2d 1293 (1979). In that case, the Liquor Commission argued 
that a liquor license constituted a privilege revocable at the 
pleasure or whim of the Liquor Commission rather than a right 
protected by the full panoply of due process guarantees. The 
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Utah Supreme Court eschewed this logic. 
Thus, appellant's driver's license is indisputably a 
property interest subject to due process protection: 
Suspension of issued licenses. . . involved 
state action that adjudicates important in-
terests of the licenses. In such cases the 
licenses are not to be taken away without 
that procedural due process required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Burson, 
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971), and Dixon v. Love, 
431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977). Also see Ballard 
v. State, 595 P.2d 1302 (^979), which cites 
with approval Bell v. Bursjon, supra. 
Once due process is implicated by a property interest, 
then the issue becomes what kind of notice and hearing are 
constitutionally required to permit the deprivation of such an 
interest. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the 
quantum and quality of the notice and the hearing vary depending 
upon the property interest implicated by the deprivation. Thus, 
the Court noted in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), 
that it was axiomatic that due process "is flexible and calls for 
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." 
Because of the severe personal ind economic hardships 
which can and do ensue in our travel-oriented society from 
suspension of a driver's license, even f0r a 90 day period, 
appellant submits that she is constitutionally entitled to a more 
meaningful hearing then she received pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 41-2-19.6 and a more meaningful review than 
she received under Utah Code Annotated Section 41-2-20. 
A. OVERVIEW OF UTAHfS PER SE REVOCATION STATUTES 
After a driver has been arreste4 for driving under the 
influence by a police officer who has reasonable grounds to 
-11-
believe a violation has occurred, the officer is authorized by 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-2-19.6 to request a chemical test 
to determine the driver's blood alochol content. If the driver 
submits to the test and the results indicate a blood alcohol con-
tent of .08% or more, then the arresting officer is authorized to 
notify the driver of the Driver License Services1 intention to 
suspend the driver's license for 90 days. The driver is issued a 
temporary license valid for 30 days. The driver is notified of 
his right to request a hearing regarding the suspension of his 
license. The request must be made in writing within 10 days of 
his arrest. 
If a hearing is heldf it is held before an officer 
employed by the respondenet. The scope of the hearing is limited 
to 1) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe 
the person to have been operating a motor vehicle under the 
influence, 2) whether the person submitted to a chemical test, 
and 3) if sof the results of the test. 
In addition to this administrative review, Utah Code 
Annotated Section 41-2-20 authorizes the driver to file a peti-
tion for review in the district court in the county in which he 
resides. The statute specifically circumscribes the scope 
of the district court's review: 
The court's jurisdiction is limited to a 
review of the record to determine whether 
or not the department's decision was 
arbitrary or capricious. 
B. WHAT IS THE CHARACTER OP A SECTION 
41-2-19.6 ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 
The resolution of whether the procedures provided under Utah Code 
Annotated Section 41-2-19.6 and Section 41-2-20 are constitu-
- 12 -
tionally permissible requires close scrutiny of the nature of the 
administrative hearing. Utah Code Annotated Section 41-2-19.6 
provides that the arresting officer must submit a copy of the 
citation issued regarding the offense, as well as a sworn report 
indicating the chemical test result, if any, and other bases for 
officer's belief that the driver was under the influence. The 
sworn report is also endorsed by the chief of police, or a person 
authorized by him. The endorsement of the arresting officer's 
report by the chief of police presumably lends credence or 
integrity to the accuracy of that report. However, the actual 
safeguarding benefit of this measure se^ms highly questionable. 
C. MACKEY V. MONtRYM 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the 
Supreme Court enunciated the factors which a court must balance 
when evaluating what process is constitutionally due to protect 
against an erroneous deprivation of a pifotectible property 
interest: 
First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards; 
and finally, the Government's interest, 
including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that 
the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. 
The Supreme Court applied these factors to a review of 
the Massachusetts implied consent law in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 
U.S. 1 (1979). The license revocation ip Massachusetts occurs 
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whenever a driver refuses to submit to a chemical test. The 
revocation is based upon a report from a peace officer filed with 
the state licensing agency. The post-revocation review system 
provides multiple levels of review. The Eirst review is an 
appearance before the Registrar of Motor Vehicles. The second 
review is before an administrative body known as the Board of 
Appeal. The final review is a judicial review. 
Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test in Montrym, the 
court identified the private interest as the driver's interest in 
continued possession and use of his license pending the outcome 
of the revocation hearing. Citing Dixon v. Lovef 431 U.S. 105 
(1977)f the court noted that the property interest was a substan-
tial one because a state could not make a driver whole for any 
personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by reason 
of an erroneous suspension. However, the court also pointed out 
that the actual weight given to a private interest depended upon 
weighing three factors: 1) the duration of the revocation; 2) 
the availability of hardship relief; and 3) the availability of 
post-revocation review. The court concluded that the ninety day 
suspension combined with the availability of immediate post-
revocation review outweighed any constitutional deficiency which 
was implicated by the absence of any hardship relief in the 
Massachusetts statute. 
In considering the second prong of the Mathews v. 
Eldridge test, the court reviewed the likelihood of an erroneous 
deprivation and emphasized that the Due Process Clause does not 
mandate error-free governmental decisions: 
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Thus, even though our legal tradition 
regards the adversary process as the 
best means of ascertaining truth and 
minimizing the risk of error, the 
"ordinary principle" established by 
our prior decisions is that "something 
less than an evidentiary hearing is 
sufficient prior to adverse adminis-
trative action." Dixon v. Love, supra, 
(431 U.S.) at 113 (97 S.Ct. at 1728). 
And, when prompt postdeprivation review 
is available for correction of admin-
istrative error, we have generally re-
quired no more than that predeprivation 
procedures used be desinged to provide 
a reasonably reliable basis for concluding 
that the facts justifying the official 
action are as a responaible governmental 
official warrants them to be. 
Id. at J.3. 
Thus, the Court was satisfied that the Massachusetts procedure 
provided enough due process because it provided a "reasonably 
reliable basis" for concluding whether a driver had refused to 
submit to a chemical test. Significantly, the Court was 
satisfied that the risk of erroneous deprivation seemed minimal 
where the determination of whether there was a refusal depended 
upon "objective facts." 443 U.S. at 13. Additionally, the Court 
felt that any administrative error could be cured by a prompt 
post deprivation evidentiary hearing. 
The third factor analyzed in Montrym was the public 
interest. The Montrym court concluded that keeping the roads 
safe and free of drunk drivers together with avoiding fiscal and 
administrative burdens outweighed the private interest and the 
risk of erroneous deprivation. 
D. UTAH STATUTES FAIL TO PROVIDE THE MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS 
MANDATED BY MONTRYM AND DUE PROCESS 
Comparing Montrym to the facts and statutes implicated 
in the case at bar compels the conclusion that Utah Code 
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Annotated Section 41-2-19.6 and Section 41-2-20 deprive Utah 
Drivers of their licenses without due process of law. By sub-
jecting the Utah statutory scheme to a Mathews v. Eldridge analy-
sis
 f two defects emerge. First, the postdeprivation review, 
although prompt, is constitutionally inadequate. Second, the 
risk of erroneous deprivation is substantial. These factors com-
bine under the Utah statutory scheme in such a fashion that a 
driver never receives a meaningful hearing in a due process sense 
either before or after the deprivation of his license. 
In Montrym, the Court was impressed by the availability 
of prompt postdeprivation review. Under the Massachusetts sta-
tute, a driver is afforded two tiers of administrative review as 
well as a judicial review. 443 U.S. at 6, Footnote 4. The 
Montrym court emphasized that the availability of a prompt post-
deprivation evidentiary hearing was critical to upholding the 
Massachusetts statute: 
Thus, even though our legal tradition 
regards the adversay process as the best 
means of ascertaining truth and minimizing 
the risk of error, the "ordinary principle" 
established by our prior decisions is that 
"something less than an evidentiary hearing 
is sufficient prior to adverse administrative 
action. 443 U.S. at 13. 
Emphasis supplied. 
In contrast, under the Utah statutes, the appellant had 
one administrative evidentiary hearing followed by a judicial 
review limited to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 
In the context of reviewing a Section 41-2-19.6 hearing, 
an arbitrary and capricious review of the record is tantamount to 
no review at all. In Utah Department of Administrative Services 
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v. Public Services Commission, 658 P.2d|601 (Utah 1983), the 
court makes it clear that fact finding from an administrative 
hearing will not be reversed unless the record is bereft of any 
evidence to support the finding. 
Thus, in reviewing decisions on unemploy-
ment compensation. . . we have declared 
that we will sustain the finding of the 
Industrial Commission if "there is 
evidence of any substance whatever which 
can reasonably be regarded as supporting 
the determination made. . . " 
Id. at £09 
Because a Section 41-2-19.6 hearing will always include the 
arresting officer's testimony, and because that testimony will 
realistically always include the officer's testimony that he 
detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage, the hearing officer's 
determination will always be supported by some evidence. 
In a similar context, the California Supreme Court 
mandated in Berlinghieri v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 657 P.2d 
383 (Calif. 1983), that the judicial review of administrative 
decisions suspending a driver's license under California's 
implied consent law requires application of the independent 
judgment standard rather than the substantial evidence standard. 
In reaching this conclusion, the California court stressed that 
the retention of a driver's license was such an important right 
to citizens in our travel-oriented society that the stricter 
standard of review was constitutionally required. The substan-
tial evidence test in Berlinghieri is the equivalent of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review in Section 41-2-20. 
This standard is constitutionally inadequate to buttress the sum-
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mary nature of a Section 41-2-19.6 hearing. These statutes 
offend due process as that phrase has been construed by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Our high court has observed that "the essential 
requirement of due process is that every citizen be afforded his 
'day in court'. It has always been the policy of our law to 
resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day 
in court on the merits of a controversy." Celebrity Club, Inc. 
v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 1293 1296 (Utah 1979). 
Sections 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20 prevent a Utah driver from ever 
receiving a hearing on the merits. 
In other United States Supreme Court decisions, due pro-
cess has been satisfied because of the adequacy of post-
deprivation review. In Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 
disability-benefit termination procedures were upheld where the 
recipient was afforded an opportunity to make extensive written 
submissions to the decision-maker before the initial termination 
decision was made. Additionally, the recipient was entitled to a 
full evidentiary hearing after termination of benefits. In Dixon 
v. Love, supra, the challenged statute permitted summary revoca-
tion of a driver's license based on the strength of a cummulative 
record of traffic convictions. In upholding the statute, the 
court stressed that a driver "had the opportunity for a full 
judicial hearing in connection with each of the traffic decisions 
on which the . . . decision was based." 431 U.S. at 113. 
The other factor which the Montrym court stressed, and 
which distinguishes the case at bar, is that the risk of 
erroneous deprivation is certainly not minimal under the Utah 
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statutory scheme. The Montrym court emphasized, when considering 
the second prong of the Mathews v, Eldridge test, that the com-
bination of prompt postrevocation review plus the "reasonably 
reliable basis" of ascertaining objective facts in the context of 
a refusal to submit to a chemical test Conferred sufficient due 
process upon a driver to save the Massachusetts scheme from 
constitutional infirmity. 
In sharp contrast, the Utah statutory scheme fails in 
both regards. As already discussed, the post-deprivation review 
is inadequate and the initial Section 4|.-2-19.6 hearing does not 
provide a "reasonable reliable basis" for ascertaining objective 
facts. Unlike Montrym, where the hearing officer's inquiry is 
limited to a simple resolution of whether a driver refused to 
submit to a chemical testf the Utah hearing officer must inquire 
into the realm of contested and subjective facts. Utah Code 
Annotated Section 41-2-19.6 requires the hearing officer to 
ascertain 1) whether he had probable ca^ ise to believe the driver 
was under the influence and 2) whether the blood alcohol result 
of .08% or more was accurate. Notwithstanding Montrym, the 
Supreme Court has never held a police officer's version of a 
disputed encounter between the police and a private citizen is 
inevitably accurate and reliable. Because the officer is 
involved in the competitive enterprise <^f ferreting out crime, 
his perceptions are not necessarily unbiased. However, in the 
instant action, the trooper's subjective opinion about the 
appellant's performance on the field agility tests was accepted 
by the hearing officer, and the appellant's own opinion was 
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rejected. Additionally, although the determination of whether a 
particular blood alcohol test result is accurate may be ascer-
tainable from "objective facts," the record in the instant matter 
discloses that that incompetent evidence was received to reach 
that determination. Moreover, even in the absence of the intoxi-
lyzer test result, the facts in evidence do not support a conclu-
sion that the respondent established that the appellant was under 
the influence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The scope of the inquiry at the Section 41-2-19.6 
hearing clearly exceeds the scop€> of the Montrym inquiry. It 
also exceeds the scope of the hearing discussed in Dixon v. Love, 
supra. There the focus of the hearing centered simply on 
reviewing routinely maintained records of traffic convictions. 
Clearly there is a significant difference between ascertaining 
objective facts, such as adjudicated convictions in Dixon, and 
refusals in Montrym, and subjective facts under Section 
41-2-19.6, such as a driver's performance on field sobriety 
tests, a driver's driving pattern, or the accuracy of a blood 
alcohol test result. 
The appellant submits that a driver is constitutionally 
entitled to a trial de novo review in the district court under 
the challenged statutory scheme. Only if the driver receives a 
full evidentiary judicial review can it be said that he has 
received a constitutionally "meaningful11 hearing. In the absence 
of a trial de novo in the district court, appellant submits she 
was denied due process of law. 
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E. THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
BECAUSE THE SAME EMPLOYEE OF RESPONDENT 
ACTED BOTH AS PROSECUTOR AND JUDGE 
At appellant's administrative hearing, Dennis Hicks, an 
employee of the Driver's License Division, presided as the hearing 
officer. At said hearing, Mr. Hicks asked appellant numerous 
questions. Appellant submits that Mr. Hicks was not an impartial 
decisionmaker since he also acted as prosecutor eliciting evi-
dence and presenting the respondent's case against the appellant. 
In Vali Convalescent & Care Institution v. Industrial 
Commissionf 649 P.2d 33 (Ut. 1982 ) f this court observed that the 
practice of an agency acting both as prosecutor and judge at an 
administrative hearing was not unconstitutional if those distinct 
functions were kept separate within the agency. Appellant sub-
mits that Vali mandates that if an agency is going to perform 
both a prosecutorial and a judicial function, then a different 
person employed by that agency must perform those distinct func-
tions. The same person cannot serve both roles and retain his 
impartiality as the judicial decisionmaker. 
In Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital, 656 P.2d 420 (Ut. 1982)
 f 
this Court observed that the Second Injury Fund must be treated 
as a separate entity from the Industrial Commission not-
withstanding the fact that the Industrial Commission directs the 
Institution of the Second Injury Fund. 
. . . the Second Injury Fund n^eds to 
have independent administrative direction 
within the Industrial Commission from some 
official not responsible for the adjudi-
cative functions of the commission that 
"direct its distribution." 
Id. at 422. 
The administrative hearing officer employed by the 
respondent who conducted the § 41-2-19.6 hearing in this case 
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does not have the necessary separation of judicial and prosecu-
torial functions. Because the judge and prosecutor are one and 
the same individual, in administrative § 41-2-19.6 hearings, 
independent judicial decisions are not made after the adversial 
system has had an opportunity to present competent evidence. 
Due process requires a fair trial in a fair tribunal. 
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). The appellant did not 
receive a fair trial at her § 41-2-19.6 hearing because the tri-
bunal was not impartial. 
POINT VI 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 41-2-19.6 
AND 41-2-20 DENY UTAH DRIVERS WHO SUBMIT 
TO CHEMICAL TESTS EQUAL PROTECTION OF 
THE LAW 
If a Utah driver submits to a chemical test and the test 
result exceeds .08%, his license is subject to suspension under 
U.C.A. Sections 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20. In contrast, if a Utah 
driver refuses to cooperate and refuses to submit to a chemical 
test, his license is subject to suspension under U.C.A. Section 
41-6-44.10(2). However, the suspension under the implied consent 
law takes place only after the department has notified the driver 
of a "refusal" hearing. The arresting officer is subpeonaed by 
the Department and appears in person at the hearing. His sworn 
testimony is subject to cross-examination by the driver. This 
decision of the administrative hearing can be appealed to the 
district court where the court "is vested with jurisdiction, and 
it shall set the matter for trial de novo upon 10 days written 
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notice to the department and thereupon take testimony and examine 
into the facts of the case and determine whether the petitioner's 
license is subject to revocation under the provisions of this 
act." Thus, the uncooperative driver receives a full evidentiary 
hearing at the judicial level. Additionally, because of the de 
novo nature of the refusal hearing under the implied consent law, 
the driver who refuses to submit to a chemical test also receives 
the reinstatement of his license pending the outcome of his 
appeal in the district court or the Supreme Court, Cullimore v. 
Schwendiman, 652 P.2d 915 (Ut. 1982). In contrast, Sections 
41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20 do not provide for the reinstatement of the 
driver's license during the pendency of the judicial review. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution does not deny to States the 
power to treat different classes of persons in different ways. 
However, it does deny to States the power to legislate that dif-
ferent treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into 
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to a 
legitimate objective of the statute: 
A classification 'must be reasonable, 
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some 
ground of difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of 
the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly circumstanced si^ all be treated 
alike. ' Royster Guano Co.| v. Virginia, 
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),. 
The question therefore becomes whether there is some 
ground of difference that rationally explains the different 
treatment of drivers who submit to a chemical test and drivers 
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who refuse to submit to a chemical test. The plaintiff submits 
that the State's different treatment of the two categories of 
drivers does not bear any reasonable or rational relationship to 
the State's legitimate interest in removing drunken drivers from 
the Utah highways. 
In Montrym, the court was persuaded that by affording a 
driver a presuspension hearing, public safety would be undermined 
because the drunk driver would receive an incentive to refuse to 
take a chemical test and demand a presuspension hearing as a 
dilatory tactic. However, in the case at bar, both the driver 
who refuses and the driver who submits receive a presuspension 
hearing. The only difference is that the driver who refuses 
receives significantly more due process than the driver who 
cooperates and submits to the test. The legitimate state 
interest in offering incentives to take a test which can provide 
relaible evidence of intoxication is clearly not served by 
rewarding the driver who refuses to take the test. Because the 
different treatment of the two classes of Utah drivers in no way 
rationally furthers the State's interest in convicting and 
keeping impaired drivers off the highways of Utah, the challenged 
statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant seeks a reversal of th€* judgment suspending 
her driving privileges for ninetydays. Appellant alsoseeks a 
determination by this court that U.C.A. § 41-2-19.6 and § 41-2-20 
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deny Otah drivers both the due process of the law and the 
equal protection of the law. 
Respectfully submitted this [_ da|y of w Vij\, l \ , 1985, 
-}iiil^ ^Mi^H 
o 
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2w \K)M^I\ ^ 
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Attorney for Appellant 
#8 Eastj Broadway 
Judge Building, Suite 426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
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jV, / ( / ) , 1985, I served four (^ ) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant on Bruce Hale, Attorney for Respondent, 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114. 
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"APPENDIX 1" 
cncersigr.ec, beir.g TZ$\ c . y swcm, state mat: 
Breath testing instrument, INTOXE.YZER,.serial [number 27— /C2 4*^0 
located at Sfl S/SPT/rfrft ^Z) was properly checked by Be/us to the 
of official duties, en 25~j!2sj!r » d ^ j a t WSe Pu. 
2. This was dop« »fr-r>rriinp tn th> »tapdaxds established by the Commissioner of 
the Utah Department of Public Safety. 
3. This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were made at the 
time these tests were done. 
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: 
^y" Y E S N 0 
(*ytlectrical power check: (Power switch on, power indicator light is on) (z*-^ t \ 
(^"Temperature check (Ready light is on) [A^ ( ) 
(/flnternal purge check: (Air pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds) (^"" ( ) 
W Z e r o set. Error indicator, and Printer check: 
(Zero set at .000. .001. .002, .003.) 
(•With proper zero set, printer works properly) 
(Error light comes on when operated with wrong ziro set) 
(Printer deactivated when error light is on) 
j?{ ) Fixed absorbtion calibrator test (if equipped) fi/*7m£j?4//ff/t0 
(Reads within • .011 of calibration setting) ' 
Wchecked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests within + .01%) 
W a i v e s readings in percent blood alcohol by weight, based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 cubic centimeters of blood. 
REPAIRS REQUIRED A/**/** 
(*r, ( ) 
in () 
( r ( ) 
if^ C) 
( ) f^r" 
(T () 
19 
(If yes, explain) 
The simulator solution was of the correct kind and properly |compounded. 
(*f*The results of this test show that the instrument is working properly. 
Last prior check of this instrument was done on /<? jfe^^ 
BREATH TEST TECHNICIAN(S) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ~TP/? 
L^£-
COUNTY OF AAH \ s. k* - ) I /we. on oath, state tha^ the foregoing is trueu 
^.••"-*>.,., 
% £ —• cJ2z&L 
Si^ l>e?iibedr^ rui sWofn before me this 35- day of ^T^i^, 
J/LYiArfM'W'-fiMrfirLfi.fl City of residence - k u ^ u ^tf» T Notary >ublic<V / 
My comnussiOA -expires lU A , ^i 
County of resipence_ 
"APPENDIX 2" 
Section 41-6-44.3 provides as follows: 
(1) The commissioner of public safety shall 
establish standards for the administration 
and interpretation of chemical analysis of 
a person's breath including standards of 
training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was driving 
or in actual physical control of a vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or 
driving with a blood alcohol content of 
,10% or greater, documents offered as 
memoranda or records of acts, conditions 
or events to prove that the analysis and 
accuracy of the instrument were made pur-
suant to standards established in sub-
section (1) shall be admissible if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were made 
in the regular course of the investi-
gation at or about the time of the 
act, condition or event; and 
(b) The source of information from 
which made and the method and cir-
cumstances of their preparation were 
such as to indicate their trust-
worthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards 
established under subsection (1) and 
the provisions of subsection (2) have 
been met, there shall be a presumption 
that the test results are valid and 
further foundation for introduction of 
the evidence is unnecessary. 
"APPENDIX 3" 
8TCEATH TESTIW3 KEGULAT10KS 
Revised: April 1 , 19£i 
Archives f i l e * 4714 
Revised: November 4 , , 1983 
Archives f i l e # 6734 
PEPAKTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Y~y E. Lujtneji 
CGttU*£onVL 
c , T A r 
3; ' «-*>.<• 
. ** / ^ . ^ v o ^ L/ 
I . TECHNIQUES OR METHODS 
A. Tests to determine the concentration of alcohol in a persons blood, 
may be applied to blood, breath or other bodily substances. Results 
shall be expressed as equivalent to grams of alcohol per one hundred 
(100) cubic centimeters of blood. The results of such tests shall be 
entered in a permanent record book. 
B. Written check lists, outlining the method of properly performing 
the tests in use under division A of this regulation, shall be 
available at each location where tests are given. The check list and 
the test record shall be retained by the operator administering the 
test or the arresting officer. 
Definition : 
A check list sets forth the steps, in sequence, that a breath 
test operator must follow. A square is provided by each of the 
steps for the operator to check each one as| it is performed to 
insure proper operation of the test instrument. 
!!• BREATH TESTS 
A. Breath samples of alveolar air shall be analyzed with instruments 
specifically designed for the analysis of breath. The calculation 
of the blood alcohol concentration shall be on the basis of aveolar 
air to blood ratio of 2100:1. Breath samples shall be analyzed 
according to the methods described by the Manufacturer of the 
instrument or instructions issued by the office of the Commissioner 
of Public Safety. 
TESTS FOR CHECKING CALIBRATION 
A. Breath testing instruments must be certified on a routine basis 
not to exceed forty (40) days. 
B. Calibration tests must be performed by a technician using appropri-
ate solutions of ethyl alcohol, and using methods and techniques for 
checking calibration recommended by the manufacturer of the 
instrument or the office o' the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
C. Results of test for calibration shall be kept in a permanent record 
book. A report of each calibration test shall be recorded on the 
appropriate form and sent to the supervisor of the Breath Testing 
Program. The supervisor of the Breath Testing Program is heresy 
designated as the official keeper of said records. 
PROCEDURE FOR CERTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS 
A. Breathalyzer 
1. Instrument heating properly: 
a. between 47 and 53 degrees centigrade 
2. Collection chamber output: 
a. COLD between 55 and 58 cc's 
b. WARM between 50 and 54 ccvs 
3. NULL meter functioning properly: 
a. Must be able to achieve a balance and swing freely in both 
directions. 
4. READ LIGHT IN MECHANICAL CENTE^: 
Place two ampoules of the same control number in the holders , 
tu rn on the read l ight , balance galvanometer and check for 
mechanical cen te r . Switch the ampoules, turn on the read 
l ight. The null meter should not swing more than J inch in 
either direction. 
5. BLOOD ALCOHOL POINTER SLIPPAGE CHECK: 
Balance the instrument with ampoules iti the ho lders . Set 
the blood alcohol pointer on .20%, or cdnter of the EIGGG 
Alcohol scale. Using the light carnage! adjustment, ar.d with 
the read light on. run the B. A. needlei to .00% and back to 
. 2J%, observing to see that the null meter balances a: the 
same time the B. A. needle reaches .20%. Then run the B. A. 
needle to .40% and back to .20% observing to see that the null 
meter balances at the .20% line on the b}ood alcohol scale. 
6. SIMULATOR CHECK: 
At least th ree (3) simulator checks of a known value shall be 
run on the ins t rument . The resul ts must be within .01 plus 
or minus of the actual value of the knowft solution. 
7. AMPOULE CHECK: 
A series of simulator tes t s with the accumulated total of .60% 
shall be run on an ampoule from each control number on hand 
with the ins t rument . The resul ts of each simulator test must 
be within .01 plus or minus of the actual value. The ampoule 
should then be observed to see if there i$ a slight yellow color, 
indicating the presence of potasium dichi^omate. If it meets the 
above s t anda rds , the chemicals are correct or within allowed 
tolerances. 
B. In tcx i lyzer 
1 . E L E C T R I C A L POWER CHECK: With the power swi tch on, 
observe to see that the power indicator light comes on, 
indicat ing there is electrical power to the ins t rument . 
2. TEMPERATURE CHECK If the instrument is a l ready 
warmed u p , check to see that the ready Iignt is o n . 
If it is not warmed u p , wait approximately 10 mi r . j tes 
to see that the ready light comes on. (This l ight 
indicates that the sample chamber is heated to the 
proper t e m p e r a t u r e ) . 
3. I N T E R N A L PURCE CHECK: Put the mode selecto- in 
the air blank mode. Place thumb on the end of the pump 
tube to see that it is pumping air . Time the p u m r i n g 
sequence to see that it pumps for approximately 35 
seconds. 
t*. ZERO SET AND ERROR INDICATOR CHECK (As Mode!) 
Set the mode selector in the zero set mode. Depress the 
zero adjust knob and adjust the digital display to a plus 
.000 , . 0 0 1 , .002 or .003 to see that you can ach ieve a proper 
zero set. Re-set the digital display above the acceptable plus 
.000 to .003 . Place the mode selector to the test node and 
observe to see that the er ror light comes on . R e p e a t , placing 
the digital display at minus .000 and observe to see that the 
er ror light comes on when the mode selector is placed i^ the 
test mode. 
(ASA Model) 
Advance the test cycle to the zero set mode and see that 
the unit r eg i s t e r s a reading of plus .000, .001, .002, or 
.003. If this reading is not observed, 
cycle and see that the error l ight comep or: 
advance to the next 
FIXED ABSORBTION CALIBRATOR CHlECK: With the test 
card in the p r in te r , run a test on the f ixe - absorbtion 
calibrator to see that the instrument gives the correct 
reading on the digital display and the p r in ted test ca rd . 
THIS CHECK NOT REQUIRED ON INSTRUMENTS NOT 
EQUIPPED WITH THE FIXED A B S O E B T J O N CALIBRATOR. 
SIMULATOR CHECK: Run th ree tests 6n a simulator 
solution of a known value and an air blank before each 
one. Observe to see that the correct r ead ings , within 
plus or minus . 01 of the actual value is 
digital display and pr in ted on the test q 
indicated on the 
a r c fcr each simula-
tor test and a .00 reading for each a i r lb lank . 
PRINTER DEACTIVATOR CHECK: (AS (Model) Run a 
simulator tes t with the zero set NOT in i h e proper zero 
set r ange , to see that the p r in te r is deactivated and will 
not p r in t . 
(ASA Model) 
This check must be performed before t h i unit is to 
operating tempera ture , (before the r eaay lamp is on) 
Advance the unit to the first pu rge cycle {air b lank) . 
Observe the er ror l ight to see that it is j i t . A: the end 
of the test cycle (approximately 35 seconds) , see that the 
pump stops and that the pr inter is deactivated and will 
not pr in t . 
V. QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL 
A. Breath test shall be performed by a qualified operator who shall 
have completed the operators course prescribed by the Commissioner 
of Public Safety. Operators shall use only those instruments 
which they are certified to operate. 
B. Breath test operator certification requirements: 
1. Must have successfully completed training for each type of 
instrument and pass the required test, as approved b* the 
Commissioner of Public Safety. 
2. Operators must complete an approved recertificatron training 
course and pass a test every two (2) years to maintain their 
certification. 
C. Breath test technician requirements: 
1. Must comply with one of the following: 
a. Must successfully complete the Breath Testing Supervisors 
course offered by Indiana State University. 
b. A manufacturers repair technician course for the breath 
testing instruments in use in the State of Utah . 
c. Be qualified by the nature of his employment or training 
to maintain and repair the breath testing instrument in 
question and to instruct in the proper operation of the 
instrument. 
V I . REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATION 
A. The Commissioner of Public Safety may on the recommendation of 
a technician, revoke the certification of any operator: 
1. Who obtains a certification card falsely or deceitfully. 
2. Who fails to comply with the foregoinb provisions governing 
the operation of breath test instruments. 
3. Who fails to demonstrate satisfactory (performance in 
operating breath testing instruments, 
V I I . PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL 
The foregoing regulations shall not be construed as invalidating the 
qualification of personnel previously qualified! as either breath test 
operators or breath test technicians under programs existing prior 
to the promulgation of these regulations. Such personnel shall be 
deemed certified until such time as retraining |would have been re-
quired were these regulations not in effect. 
This provision shall take effect as if enacted Contemporaneously with 
the other Breath Testing Regulations of the D 
Safety on June 11, 1979. 
ppartment of Public 
In the opinion of the Department of Public Saffcty, it is necessary to 
the peace, health and welfare of the inhabitants of the State of Utah 
that this regulation become effective immediately. 
A. Training for original certification is to be conducted by a Breath 
Test Technician and should include the following: 
1 hour. . .Welcome, registration, preview of Alcohol and Traffic Safety. 
3 hours. .Effects of Alcohol in the Human Body. 
3 hours. .Operational Principles of Breath Testing. 
2 hours. .Alcoholic Influence Report Form. 
2 hours. .Testimony of the Arresting Officer. 
3 hours..Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing. 
1 hour. . .Detecting the Drinking Driver. 
8 hours. .Laboratory Participation. (Running Simulator tests on the 
instruments and tests on actual drinking subjects). 
1 hour. . .Examination and Critiques of Course. 
B. Training for recertification is to be conducted by a Breath Testing 
Technician and should include the following: 
2 hours. .Effects of alcohol in the Human Body. 
2 hours. .Operational principles of Breath Testing. 
1 hour. . .Alcohol Influence Report Form and Testimony of arresting officer. 
2 hours..Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing and Detecting and the 
Drinking Driver. 
1 hour. . .Exam. 
C. Anyone having previously successfully completed a twenty-four (2a) 
hour operators school, may be recertified at anytime by successfully 
completing an eight (8) hour recertification course, and also may be 
certified to operate another type of breath testing instrument after 
eight (8) hours instruction pertaining to the instrument in question. 
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SCOn M MAfMf SON 
UTAH HIGHWAY PATROl 
4501 South 2700 West 
Soft loke City. Ufoh, 84 i |$ | 
r«i*pKo^« (to»)f^5-«5!« By 
CUSTODIAN'S CERTIFICATE 
serf t«vf tNotw 
I , the unders igned, being f i r s t duly sworn, s tate tha t : 
1- I am the Bream Testing Supervisor of the Utah highway Patrol end t*e o f f i c i a l 
keener of and responsible fo r the maintenance check records of the breath tes t i ng 
,r. , . r , r o n r s m a i n t 2 inec in the State of Utah. 
2- -".tached are t rue a~d correct copies of the records of maintenance a^^ c e r t i f i c a t e 
:
°
r
 *"-. • J— jrt,Trt>C) # V Z £ c ser ia l number^?7^? 7 £ g l oca tec a t M » > ^ y - f e > 
course of o f f i c i a " Susinfess, fo r of --^ch the o r i g i n a l s are kept on f i l e by me, in the 
the State of U tah , Department of Public Safety and i|n accordance w i t h tre current 
recusations of the Cc^r issioner of Public Safety. 
3- "-•? attached tes ts *ere done before and a f t e r thel date of fv&LfA ..^U* IS Q ty 
- - > e breath tes t tec-^. ic ianfs) whose s ignature(s) appear on the attached a f f i d a v i t s 
a^e c e r t i f i e d by t i e State of Utah and have met one pr more of the f o l l o ^ n g requiremen 
ar, -eauired by the De;artment of Public Safety: 
i. have success?-", ly completed the Breath Testjng Supervisors course at Indiana 
U n i v e r s i t y , or 
: . a manufacturer 's repa i r technic ian course fcjr breath t e s f g instruments in 
use in the State of Utah, or 
is q u a l i f i e d by nature of his employment or 
the breath tes t ing instrument in question an| 
of the instrument. 
t r a i n i n g to ma in ta i - and repair 
id to i n s t r u c t in the proper operar 
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